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CREATION OF THE UNITED STATES WAIVER

A.
B.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GATT")1 promoted free trade by reducing tariffs, import quotas and other trade
barriers,2 as well as eliminating discriminatory treatment of member
nations.3 By signing the GATT, the United States intended to promote GATT's aims and principles.4 However, the United States subsequently adopted legislation asserting superiority of domestic law
1. The GATT is a multilateral agreement signed by President Truman in 1947. It arose
from the collapse of the International Trade Organization (the "ITO"). The legal design of the
GATT was taken from the ITO, and it consists of a set of rules and procedures for regulating
international trade. For more background information about the GATT, see K. DAM, THE

GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970), J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAW OF GATT (1969). For more information about ITO, see W. DIEBOLD, THE END OF THE
ITO (1959).
2. GATT Article XI(1) provides that:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
3.

GATT Article I in pertinent part provides:

With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges,
and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties.
4.

Clayton Center for International Economic Affairs, GA.T.T. AN ANALYSIS AND AP-

PRAISAL OF THE GENERAL AGREEmr ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

96 (1955). The United States was

the driving force behind the ITO and the GATT for trade liberalization.
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over the GATT.5 Such a contradictory approach to foreign trade regulation confused the GATT membership over both the United
States' relationship to the GATT and United States' trade policy.,
United States' promotion of domestic law over GATT law demonstrated to other GATT members that the United States would balance GATT policies with its own domestic policies on agricultural
commodities. 7 Essentially, the United States stated its unwillingness
to give GATT power over its food supply.8 This attitude of agricultural protectionism had its origins in the Great Depression. At that
time Congress established farm support programs to revitalize domestic agriculture and to provide farmers with purchasing power on
par with nonagricultural industries.9 Quotas were an integral part of
those earlier programs and were implemented when imports
threatened the price-support system. 10
The United States' quotas violated the GATT." Not willing to
discontinue its quota use, the United States asked for and received
an extensive waiver from its GATT obligations where they conflicted
with domestic law. 2 The waiver fostered distrust of the GATT by
other GATT members.'" As a result, GATT activity slowed as few
complaints were brought to the GATT for resolution. 1 4 The United
States' seeming hypocrisy was a serious blow to GATT prestige.
This commentary will assess GATT's ability to regulate agricultural import quotas.1 5 First, it will examine both sides of quota usage
5. Id. at 43-44. After the GATT Protocol was signed in 1947, § 22 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 was amended in 1948 to say that no import quotas would be imposed
which contravened GATT. If quotas were used, domestic production would have to be curtailed
as well, under the Article XI exceptions. However, § 22 was again amended in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 to state that no trade agreement entered into before or after 1951
which is inconsistent with § 22 will be applied. It is at this point that import restrictions come
into conflict with GATT.
6. Sorenson, Contradictions in U.S. Trade Policy, in U.S. TRADE POLICY AND AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS (Ferguson ed. 1975) 190-193.
7. See supra note 5. The United States at this point limited the GATT to its own domestic policies.
8. STEINER & VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1144 (1975). This statement follows from the general principle that a sovereign nation will always resist outside interference
regarding its economy and its social welfare. Agriculture fits into both of these categories.
9. EZEKIEL & BEAN, ECONOMIC BASES FOR THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT 1 (1933).
10. Id. at 1-4. Although quotas were not part of the initial Depression legislation, they
were quickly provided for two years after the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.
11. See supra note 5.
12. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 735 (1969).
13. Roschke, The GATT: Problems and Prospects, 12 J. INT'L LAW & ECON. 85, 90-93
(1977).
14. J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 759.
15. Roschke, supra note 13, at 94. See also J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 736-737
(Roschke and Jackson come to the same point, but from different directions. Roschke argues
that protectionism will never be overcome as long as the waiver is coupled with agricultural
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to weigh the underlying values the United States chose in electing to
protect its agricultural industry with quotas. Next, the effects of the
waiver on the United States and on other GATT members will be
appraised. Finally, this commentary will discuss consequences of
GATT revitalization if proposed United States budget changes take
place.

I.

CREATION OF THE UNITED STATES WAIVER

The GATT is both a treaty setting forth common rules for international trade and an organization which administers those rules,
sponsors negotiations and settles disputes arising under the treaty.1"
The goals of the GATT common rules are (i) to protect tariff concessions, (ii) to lessen nontariff trade restrictions, 17 such as import quotas, and (iii) to provide for the greatest possible observance of the
principle of nondiscrimination in world trade matters.1 8 Nondiscrimination in the GATT context means that when one GATT member
nation grants tariff concessions to another, any other member country has a right to the same concessions.1 9 Therefore, two primary
objectives of the GATT are trade liberalization and protection of underdeveloped nations in the marketplace.20
As one of the original signatories to the GATT in 1947, the
United States demonstrated approval of the goal of world free trade
and accordingly allowed its foreign trade to be regulated by the
GATT. 21 Under international law, the GATT, as a treaty, is to prevail over any domestic law.22 Certain United States domestic legislation, however, is in direct opposition to the GATT goals. 3 Among
other laws, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, (the AAA), as
amended, 24 provides for a system of agricultural trade regulation implemented by tariffs and import quotas. The AAA was designed to
insulate domestic agricultural interests from possible deleterious ecolobbying power. Jackson says that no other GATT member will be responsive to U.S. arguments for trade liberalization while the U.S. has the waiver. As a result, both agree the import
quota issue is unresolvable).
16. Clayton, supra note 4, at 16.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id. at 21.
20. Id. at 20-22.
21. See supra note 3 and note 4. See also Clayton, supra, note 4, at 20.
22. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 66 MICH. L. R. 250, at 253
(1967).
23. See supra note 5.
24. Pub. No. 10, 73d Congress, H.R. 3835. See supra note 9.
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nomic effects caused by the international market.2 5 Essentially, the
AAA originally functioned as a farmers' welfare act.
Additionally, Congress further promoted the welfare of the
United States farmer by amending the AAA in 1951.26 Responding to
a post-World War II domestic agricultural surplus, Congress provided that where a treaty and United States domestic law conflict on
the subject of agricultural quotas, domestic law shall control.2 7 As a
result, the United States found itself in a serious conflict of interest.
Contrary to international law under the Congressional mandate, the
GATT provisions no longer prevailed over AAA import restrictions.
The United States, a major proponent of free trade and a world
trade leader, in refusing to lift its import restrictions on major agricultural commodities, was in violation of its obligations under
GATT.2 However, the United States might have utilized one or more
of the GATT Articles to justify its quotas on agricultural commodities. 2 9 Several GATT provisions contain specific exceptions to the
general quota prohibition found in Article XI. These exceptions allow
members to retain some degree of control over their agricultural
commodities. 0
25. EZEKiEL & BEAN, supra note 9, at 1.
26. See supra note 5.
27. Paragraph (f) of § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935 (as amended) stated
"No trade agreement or other international agreement heretofore or hereafter entered into by
the United States shall be applied in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of this
section."
28. Clayton, supra note 4, at 44. See also J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 322. Basically, the
U.S. rejected the GATT obligation to restrict its domestic sector according to the GATT
requirements.
29. When the United States amended § 22 in 1951 it still might have enacted subsequent
legislation not inconsistent with the GATT. For example, it might have passed legislation
which curtailed domestic trade in accordance with GATT regulations under Article XI(2).
30. Within the GATT, the Articles are XI(2), XII, and XIX. Article XI(2)(c) provides
that:
Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which operate:
) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to be marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the imported product can be directly substituted; or
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is
not substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic product for
which the imported product can be directly substituted, by making the surplus available to certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices below the
current market level; or
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product
the production of which is directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the imported
commodity, if the domestic production of that commodity is relatively negligible.
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For example, Article XI of the GATT permits a country to use
import quotas on foreign goods only if such quota use is governed by
specific domestic market conditions or purposes. 3 1 Specifically, Article XI allows import quotas (i) to enforce domestic governmental
measures restricting quantities of a domestic product, (ii) to remove
a temporary surplus of that domestic product, and (iii) to protect relatively negligible domestic production that directly depends on the
imported commodity.3 2 Similarly, under Article XII, restrictions can
be used to safeguard a country's balance of international payments.3 3
Thus, if the value of imports greatly exceeds the value of exports, an
abundance of imports may threaten monetary reserves. Moreover, if
a country has a low reserve to begin with, the import restriction can
function to protect that reserve. Under Article XIX, a GATT member can suspend, modify or withdraw an obligation when any product
is being imported in such quantities or under such conditions that a
threat of serious injury to domestic producers arises. 4 As a safeguard, Article XIX requires that all member parties having a substantial interest in such action must be consulted before the excep35
tion can be utilized.
GATT Article XII(1) provides that:

Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XI, any contracting party,
in order to safeguard its external financial position and its balance of payments, may
restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported, subject to the
provisions of the following paragraphs of this Article.
GATT Article XIX(1)(a) provides that:
If, as a result of unforseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred
by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is
being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in
that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free,
in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to
prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
31. Clayton, supra note 4, at 96.
32. Id. See also J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 320. Jackson points out that interpretative
problems concerning XI(2)(c) arise over what products are covered, the criteria for the government measure that must be in effect in order to use the exception, and the way in which the
exceptions are to be applied. This special exception was resented by the less-developed and the
primary-producing countries, who viewed themselves as being unable to protect their fledgling
industries while also prohibited from using the exceptions. This made the provision appear
discriminatory.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 99. See also J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 553-65. Jackson notes that escape
clauses such as this were part of every United States trade agreement since 1947. Their purpose

was to provide for emergency relief. § 22 of the AAA of 1935 is essentially an escape clause.
35.

Id.
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The United States chose to pursue none of these available exceptions to the GATT rules. Instead, the United States retained its import restrictions and applied to the GATT in 1955 for a waiver of its
obligations. 6 Because the United States was the major trading country involved in GATT at the time, GATT could do little else but
grant the extensive waiver on United States' terms."7 Without such a
waiver, the United States would be forced to withdraw its membership, leaving the GATT a hollow organization." Consequently,
GATT conditionally waived the United States' obligations under Article XI's general quota prohibition, and required the United States
to report annually to GATT."e Inasmuch as no time limit was specified, the waiver functioned more as an amendment to GATT rules
than as a temporary release from GATT obligations.4
36. J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 735. The United States' view was that the waiver was
required to remove any possible inconsistency between the GATT obligations in order to fill
the Congressional mandate.
37. Id. Jackson argues that if the United States had been forced to carry out the congressional legislation without the waiver, damage to the legal principles might result. Apparently
this was enough of a threat to the other contracting parties (the "members") that the waiver
was granted.
38. Id. The waiver was granted under GATT Article XXV(5) which provides that:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting party by
this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half of the contracting parties.
39. Id. The waiver required the United States to report to the GATT on any actions it
takes under the § 22 provisions for imposing import quotas. It also expressly reserved other
members' rights to consultation, as well as for taking any appropriate action under Article XXIII. This Article provides that:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of:
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this
Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not
it conflicts with the provisons of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation, the contracting party may, with a view to
the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make written representations or proposals
to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any
contracting party thus approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
The remainder of Article XXIII says that if no satisfactory adjustment is effected within a
reasonable time, the CONTRACTING PARTIES will investigate and recommend or give a ruling. If the actions are serious enough, any concession or obligation can be suspended under the
Agreement.
40. Id. See also supra note 35. The extensiveness of the waiver along with the absence of
a set time limit means that Article XI will never apply to United States import quotas as long
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The GATT has the power to authorize waivers of any obligation
in the treaty upon approval by two-thirds of the GATT membership.4 1 This authority is provided in Article XXV(5)(a), which recognizes that situations arise in which rules must be excepted by an impartial group rather than by a formal amendment requiring
unanimous consent.4 2 Without a waiver provision and two-thirds approval, if a member country sought to be free of an obligation and
unanimous consent was not given, that country would have to withdraw from GATT.43
Accordingly, the United States obtained its waiver and remained
a GATT member. However, negative.reaction of other member countries showed that the waiver was costly both to the United States and
to GATT prestige. Although the waiver kept the United States
within the technical boundaries of its GATT obligations, it seriously
contradicted the spirit of GATT and undercut GATT's power to ban
import quotas.4 5 In following its domestic law, the United States
demonstrated a preference for protecting its own agricultural sector.4 6 The reasons for such a choice date back to the 1930's and the
Great Depression.47

A.

Arguments for Quota Use

One of the causes of the Great Depression was the decline in farm
purchasing power.4 8 Several factors contributed to that decline, including the farmers' failure to decrease production in the face of deas the United States keeps § 22 in effect, or that the GATT members rescind the waiver.
41. See supra note 38.
42. Clayton, supra note 4, at 54.
43. See supra note 37. See also S. METZGER, LOWERING NONrARIFF BARRIRS 131-32
(1974). Apart from those Articles already listed in note 30, Metzger lists several other ways to
except Article XI quota prohibitions. They are Articles XVIII, XX and XXI.
44. K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 260 (1970). See Jackson,
supra note 12, at 548, 710, 718, 735-37.
45. J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 736-37. Jackson points out that the waiver also impaired
United States export capability.
46. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
47. S. METZGER, LOWERING NONTARIFF BARuans 132 (1974). The United States took the
lead in reducing quantitative restrictions in the 1920's and the early 1930's, until the rise of the
Great Depression. In 1933, the United States imposed quotas under the National Industrial
Recovery Act, as well as in the Jones-Costigan Sugar Act of 1934 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935.
48. EZEKIEL & BEAN, supra note 9, at 7-9. From February 1929 to February 1933 the
relative purchasing power of agricultural commodities dropped about 66 percent. Farmers reduced expenditures by seeking to become self-sufficient. People in industries which produced
farm supplies were thrown out of work for lack of sales. This carried the vicious cycle of contraction to the point of depression.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

7

LAW
FloridaFLORIDA
Journal of INTERNATIONAL
International Law, Vol.
1, Iss.JOURNAL
2 [1986], Art. 10

[Vol. I

creased demand.49 Compounding the lack of necessary adjustment by
farmers was the existing institutions' incompetence in providing the
requisite control.50 Additionally, efforts to stabilize prices by purchasing surpluses failed.51 As a result, Congress enacted the AAA to provide protection for the farmer.52
Through the AAA, Congress sought to remedy the domestic agricultural problem by establishing a policy of maintaining parity between production and consumption of agricultural commodities.5 8 A
connected goal was to equalize agricultural purchasing power with industrial purchasing power.54 In order to achieve these ends, Congress
established, as part of the AAA, a price-support program whereby the
government purchased farm surpluses and provided for production
controls by paying farmers to restrict production. 5 The purpose of
such practices was to keep domestic agricultural commodity prices on
a par With domestic nonagricultural prices." The system continues in
effect to the present date5 7 and keeps the United States' domestic
prices at a higher level than world prices, making the United States'
market very attractive to agricultural exporting countries.5 8 However,
if imports were allowed in without restraint, agricultural market
prices would fall.5" As a consequence, the federal government would
have to purchase agricultural commodities directly off of the market
in order to keep prices elevated 0
49. Id. at 21, 37.
50. Id. at 41. Institutions which distributed farm products made no effort to coordinate
production with demand.
51. Id. at 50. The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1929 established the Farm Board and
gave it power to purchase commodities for stabilization purposes. However, it proved ineffective in controlling prices because it had no effect on the production of commodities.
52. Id. at 1. The authors argue that the statement of emergency and policy were justified
by the huge needs at the time and by being in accordance with social justice. The solutions of
the AAA were directed at existing difficulties and were needed to bring the United States out of
the great economic depression. The methods and procedures of the AAA were in full harmony
with the laws of supply and demand, according to the Department of Agriculture.
53. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, § 2(1).
54. Id. The equalization of purchasing power was to be done on a gradual basis as rapidly
as possible. The purchasing power was to be set by looking at the purchasing power of the base
period of August 1909-July 1929, excluding tobacco products.
55. EZEKIEL & BEAN, supra note 9, at 52. The AAA was largely an attempt to control the
production side of the domestic agricultural industry. This plan provided the necessary flexibility for coping with problems.
56. Id. at 1.
57. Marks and Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions To Trade, 7 LAW AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss 327, 404-406.
58. S. METZGER, supra note 47, at 134. This assumes that United States prices will always
be higher than world prices. While this may not always be true, it is usually the case.
59. Id.
60. Id. The logical extension of the argument is that it would be better to keep them from
coming in altogether than to have to spend funds to remove them from the market to keep the
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One means of avoiding such consequences is the use of import
quotas. 6 1 Import quotas are relatively easy to impose and to enforce. 2 Section 22 of the AAA establishes the procedure for limiting
imported goods.63 When the Secretary of Agriculture has reason to
believe that an incoming article renders or tends to render ineffective
any government program related to the article, he advises the President." If the President agrees, he directs the United States International Tariff Commission (the USITC) to investigate and report its
findings and recommendations. 5 If the President is in accord with
the USITC recommendations, he is then required to impose a fee or
quantitative restriction upon the import.6 In the event the threat
7
passes, the President can lessen or lift the restriction.
These restrictions on agricultural imports are useful for more
than the protection of market prices. During periods of high unemployment or high inflation, quotas serve as independent protective
measures that provide for short-term solutions to economic
problems.66 Whenever there is substantial appreciation of the dollar
abroad, quotas allow regulation of the resultant increased cash flow
out of the United States.6 ' Unrestricted quantities of imported goods
coming into the United States market cause domestic workers to lose
jobs because of the lowered supply need. 0 This leads to production
price up.

61. Id. See also I. MINrz, U.S.

IMPORT QUOTAS: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 12 (1973).
62. See supra note 47.
63. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (as amended 1935), 7 U.S.C. 624, by the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1935, 65 STAT. 75.
64. Id. The Secretary of Agriculture is usually informed by individuals or groups who
have an interest in the import area.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The President can also provide import relief under Chapter 1 of Title III of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411), as revised by Title IX of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act allows United States citizens to file complaints with the
Office of the United States Trade Representative when a foreign country is not living up to its
agreement, or is engaging in conduct which burdens or restrains United States commerce. If the
USTR takes up the complaint, it must consult with the foreign government. It must investigate
the case and make a recommendation to the President within a specified time. The President
must publish his reasons for acting or not acting.
68. See generally MONROE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY IN TRANSITION (1975). See also
MINTz, U.S. IMPORT QUOTAS: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES (1973). Mintz argues that while quotas
are supposedly more flexible than tariffs, therefore easier to impose and remove, there is no
evidence to support the view.
69. Id. Quotas do this by cutting down on the amount of goods coming into the domestic
market, thus diminishing the amount of money spent on foreign goods. Less money is spent on
goods that relatively cost more now because there are fewer goods to purchase.
70. Id. If it is assumed the demand stays constant, which is usually the case in agriculture, the large influx of foreign goods will cut into the amount of goods sold in the domestic
market, thereby slowing production.
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cut-backs. Quotas solve this problem by artificially creating a greater
demand, thus causing production increases which result in more
jobs. 1
Quotas also protect agricultural production, an area of the economy that is largely dependent upon noneconomic factors. 7 2 Agricultural production relies on natural conditions such as soil, climate and
geography. 73 Moreover, natural disasters, pests and poor weather can
have a great effect upon production. 7 ' Agricultural supply is difficult
to predict and fluctuates, while agricultural demand remains relatively constant.75 By using quotas, the United States attempts to control a vital and unstable area and to ensure national security.

B.

Arguments Against Quota Use

Despite the benefits of stable prices and a steady supply of agricultural goods, the GATT general prohibition on quota use 76 reflects
the reasonable belief that quotas and import restrictions are inconsistent with free trade. Quotas promote bilateralism, discrimination
concerning import privileges and regimentation of private enterprise
by government. 7 Bilateralism and discrimination arise because quotas function on a first come, first served basis, which engenders contracts between the United States and individual countries to fill the
quotas.7 8 Furthermore, quota use is deemed to be government by
79
men and not by law, a situation viewed as clogging the marketplace.
Quotas distort trade because they create a discrepancy in cost between world and domestic goods and cause an artificial scarcity of
goods. 80 They also allow windfall gains for producers and importers.8 1
71. See generally BALDWIN, NON'rAIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1970).
72. Dodds, U.S./Common Market Agricultural Trade, 5 Nw. J. INT'L LAW & Bus. 326,
334-35 (1983).
73. Id. Agriculture, in contrast with other industries, relies on technological and economic
factors as well.
74. Id. Dodds points out that the 1982 raisin and tomato crops were destroyed by violent
storms in California.
75. Id. Agricultural demands are constant and constantly grow as the world population
grows. It is precisely this fluctuation in supply that brings out protectionism.
76. Article XI of the GATT (1979).
77. V.A. SEYID MUHAMMED, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WORLD TRADE 193 (1938).
78. Bilateralism is the making of an agreement between two parties. Discrimination is the
result of quota filling. When a quota is filled, some exporting countries will be allowed to ship
goods in based on some choice process.
79. Wilson, Nontariff Barriers to InternationalTrade: A Survey of Current Problems, 18
JOURNAL OF PUBLIc LAW 427, 429 (1969) (Part of a statement of Congressman T.B. Curtis who
argued that quotas and other devices are different from tariffs as trade barriers because any
business person can figure out the adjustment, but this cannot be done with a quota).
80. Id. at 428-29.
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At the same time, they are expensive to consumers8 2 and yield no
revenue to the government.83 Moreover, quotas result in poor allocation of resources84 and decrease the efficiency, technological progress,
productivity and growth of the industry they purportedly protect because the industry is shielded from competition. 85 Finally, quotas
lower the export quantity level of other countries, thereby restricting
the balance of payments based on export trade.8 6
The balance of payments issue demonstrates how one-way quotas
restrict trade. The United States is the world leader in agricultural
exports.8 7 The European Economic Community, (the ECC), a regional union of European countries, is one of the United States' largest customers, and imports substantial quantities of United States'
agricultural goods.8 8 The EEC in turn sells dairy products to the
United States. When the United States imposes restrictions on its
imports of dairy products, it lessens the amount of dairy products the
EEC can sell to them. This creates a balance of payments.problem
for the EEC, because it lacks the requisite income to pay for imported commodities. 89 Consequently, in order to equalize the balance
of payments, the EEC is forced to limit imports of needed agricultural goods from the United States.9 0
Not only do quotas restrict trade within the context of balance of
payments between trading countries, but they also create cost in81.
82.
83.

Id. at 429. See also I. Miwrz, U.S.
See infra note 91.
Wilson, supra note 79, at 429.

IMPORT QUOTAS: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES

(1973).

84. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 34 (1970). Resource use
allocation is one of the cornerstones of international trade, because it means that each country
should be free to develop its own natural resources to their best use and to benefit from the
best use by selling the products of the natural resources on the open market or trading them for
goods from other countries. Quota use alters the use of the resource by denying the product a
place on the open market of other countries.
85. Id. at 37. Quotas cut of the competitive advantages of open competition. A protected
industry need not worry about competing with others for consumer dollars because the price
and quantity are being set for the consumer. It is the consumer and the protected industry
which lose from the protection.
86. Wilson, supra note 79, at 430. When a country has no place for its goods, it loses
money from lack of sales, and particularly for agricultural goods, money is lost from having to
store the surpluses brought on by lack of sale. If the country also needs to import goods, money
leaves the country in the purchase of the goods imported, leaving a deficit in the balance of
payments.
87. OPERATIONS OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, 33rd Report (1981) USITC Publication 1308, 3 (1982).
88. Id. at 98.
89.

See supra note 86.

90. GATT Article XII allows this restriction to take place. The restriction of trade is the
result of the quota imposed by the United States. With the GATT waiver, neither country is at
fault, but no one gains.
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creases to consumers.9 1 When quotas are placed on imported goods,
the domestic industry does not have to compete with the lower world
market price. 2 For example, the price for butter in London was 32.1
cents per pound, while in Chicago it was 68 cents per pound because
of the United States dairy product quota.93 For dry milk, the London
price was 9.4 cents per pound, while the United States market price
was 27.0 cents per pound." This price differential is absorbed directly by the consumer. The importer profits even more than the domestic producer because the importer buys at a lower price on a foreign market and his mark-up is greater than that of the domestic
producer. 5 Because lower income families consume more dairy products, they pay the most in this scheme.9
Studies have estimated the cost to consumers for the United
States' sugar restrictions to be between $265 million to $317 million
per year.9 7 If the quota on wheat were lifted, consumers would save
an estimated $600 million annually.9 8 It is estimated that if import
restrictions on all competitive products were lifted, there would be an
aggregate saving to consumers of approximately 2% of the Gross National Product, or about $20 billion. 9
Debate concerning the pros and cons of quota use as a means of
trade regulation is ongoing. While politicians and statesmen are
aware of the arguments, the United States continues to use quotas1 oo
The reasons for their use are strongly rooted in economic, social and
political objectives.1 01 The stability of price and quantity expectation,
as well as the role food plays in our national defense, precludes agricultural trade liberalization. 10 2 It is a matter of national policy that
farmers are to be protected and supported to ensure both the nonoc91. I. MINTZ, U.S. IMPORT QUOTAS: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 8-10 (1973). Mintz points out
that quota costs are hard to determine. A distinction is drawn between direct and indirect
costs. Indirect costs are those costs that result from the impairment of competition. These indirect costs are not figured in the cost of import quotas here.

92.

See supra note 85.

93. See supra note 91, at 71.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 73.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 40. But cf. BALDWIN, supra note 84, at 39. One investigator claimed that if
restrictions were abolished the cost of sugar would decline by $785 million.
98. See supra note 77, at 85.
99. Id. at 87.
100. See supra note 87, at 18.
101. See supra note 57, at 405.
102. Id. at 404. The authors point out that when there is a conjunction of strong objectives and the role of food in national defense, then agricultural policy is almost identical with
domestic policy. The end result is that agriculture will be protected as a matter of national
security.
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currence of another depression and parity of buying power for the
agricultural sector.10 3 The agricultural lobby is strong despite the fact
that the farmer population is only about 15 percent of the total population and agricultural production is 3 percent or less of the Gross
National Product.10 4 Conversely, consumers are a diffuse public
group with comparatively less political force. 0 r As a result, the
United States continues to adhere to its GATT waiver. 0 6

II.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE

GATT

WAIVER

The United States waiver caused two concerns among GATT
members: United States credibility and GATT viability. Agriculture
is GATT's most dismal failure, 0 7 and the United States' waiver is an
example of that failure.10 8 The United States, while arguing for free
trade, used economic power to receive its extensive waiver from
GATT for activities contrary to free trade. 0 9 Other countries viewed
this as hypocrisy." 0 As a result, they countered with import quotas
restricting United States agricultural exports."' Even though the
United States has acted with reserve in its use of the waiver,"' 2 these
countries refuse to dismantle or liberalize their quota programs as
long as the waiver remains in effect." 3
Because the United States received the waiver, other member nations lost faith in GATT as a legislative means for dispute resolu103. See supra note 53. These are essentially the provisions of the AAA, which as passed
in a time of national emergency.

104.

MONROE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY IN TRANSITION 95

(1975).

105. Id. Although there are consumer groups which act as watchdogs on the federal government, there is no identified group like the agriculture lobbyists that look out for the interests of the consumer. Thus farm lobbyists have more political power and are able to further
themselves politically as a result.
106. See supra notes 99 and 100, and accompanying text.
107. Roschke, supra note 13, at 94-5.
108. J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 737.
109. Id. at 735.
110. Id. Jackson points out that although other nations viewed this as a hypocritical act,
the United States did not remain alone for long, because many countries use import quotas in
violation of GATT, and do so openly.
111. S. METZGER, supra note 47, at 136. Other GATT members can retort to United
States' complaints of their violations under the GATT stating that the United States has no
basis for complaint because it is saved from violation by a waiver but the United States still
violates the GATT spirit as embodied in Article XI.
112. J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 737. In 1966, the average degree of protection on agricultural products in developed countries was: EEC - 52%, European Free Trade Association 36%, United States - 18%, and Canada - 12%.
113. Id. See also supra note 84, at 14. Baldwin argues no country will unilaterally remove
its import restrictions because doing so would result in a balance of payments deficit, even
though economists have shown trade restrictions reduce a country's real income.
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tion. 114 It was evident that United States GATT violations would
continue even if the waiver were not granted. 115 Since the United
States was the world's most powerful trade country, the GATT could
not withstand the loss of its membership."' This use of economic
power by the United States caused GATT members to eschew the
legal and formal complaint system.1 7 Members did not take their
complaints to GATT."' Instead, they resolved disputes outside the
GATT framework by independent negotiation. 1 9 Consequently, use
of the GATT dispute settlement procedure almost disappeared. 20
III.

TOWARD

GATT

REVITALIZATION

Until recently, the United States waiver from GATT was a lasting
aggravation to other countries and a serious blow to GATT prestige

and power. 12 ' United States' agricultural policy, as established by the

AAA, entailed price supports and quota use. However, the announcement of the 1986 Reagan Budget suggests that the United States'
agricultural policy may be changing. 122 Under the proposed Budget,
the long-term Administration plan gradually reduces farm subsidies
and eliminates direct government farm loans. 12 3 Over the next five
years agriculture will come under market-oriented policies intended
to make United States grain, cotton and dairy products more competitive in the world market.' 2' The government role will become

that of negotiator for farmers on the world market.' 25
This change in policy stems from a desire to limit federal spending and adopt a market-oriented' 26 view of economics. 27 Under the
114. Roschke, supra note 13, at 94.
115. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. The congressional mandate would have
been carried out, especially since Congress passed the enactment.
116. J. JACKSON, supra note 12, at 736. At that time, the GATT membership was only
about 1/ of what it is today, and there were no regional powers like the EEC.
117. See supra notes 37-38.
118. Id. There was only one complaint brought to the GATT for resolution in the 1960's.
119. Id.
120. See supra note 13. There are other factors at play, but they existed before and after
the waiver. These factors include lack of dispute resolution, length of time to dispute resolution, if any, and lack of enforcement of GATT provisions for punitive measures.
121. See supra notes 117-120.
122. See generally New York Times, Feb. 10-24, 1985.
123. New York Times, Feb. 24, 1985, at 13, col. 5.
124. Id. Feb. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
125. Id. Feb. 22, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
126. "Market oriented" means letting the agriculture arena become subject to free-market policies and forces, as well as the deregulation of agriculture by eliminating loans and reducing the subsidies program.
127. New York Times, Feb. 24, 1985, at 13, col. 5.
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Administration's view, subsidy payments result in overproduction
and freeze prices at artificially high levels, making United States agriculture noncompetitive in the world market. 28 The subsidies program, coupled with abundant farmer credit availability, purchasing,
and expansion in the 1970s, has led to tremendous farmer debt in the
1980s. 2 Subsidies have also caused excessive investments by farmers, creating a 63% increase in total farmer liability. This liability
has risen from $132 billion in 1979 to $215 billion. 30
The proposed Reagan Budget recognizes that the agricultural policies of the 1930s need revision. The United States should drop its
GATT waiver and eliminate its agricultural quotas. This would allow
for national and international benefits to GATT and the United
States.
On a national level, the United States would benefit from dropping its waiver and eliminating agricultural import quotas. Ending
quota use would benefit the consumer, since lower food costs would
follow.' " In addition the agricultural arena would be opened to increased competition. 32 This competition would invite a more economic use of resources, while keeping the arena alive for greater
growth and development. 13 3 Under the present quota system, the federal government maintains a system for imposing quotas."" Ceasing
quota use would stop the need for this regulation, thereby elimination two clogs on the market place: regulation by the government and
divisive battles between member nations for a first come spot in the
quota system. Although the quota system protects jobs, this artificial
means is another example of government interference in an area
which can no longer afford it. 3 5 Finally, the risk of relinquishing the
food supply to market influences is not great. This nation usually has
an overproduction of food, as evidenced by the limited number of
items on restriction. " 6 Also, United States' market prices are higher
than world market prices. United States' purchasing power would insure availability of food.
Internationally, free trade will be enhanced and the GATT will be
strengthened. Abolishing the waiver will show other GATT members
128. Id. Feb. 22, at 11, col. 6.
129. Id. Feb. 10, at 1, col. 3.
130. Id.
131. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
136. In 1981, import quotas imposed under authority of § 22 were on the following products: condensed milk, cheese, butter, frozen cream, peanuts and cotton. The nature and number
of goods under quota stays fairly constant.
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the United States supports the GATT goals of free trade.13 7 The
GATT prohibition against import quotas will be given renewed viability. A greater feeling of unanimity of purpose will be fostered
among GATT member nations, resulting in greater trade liberalization. The United States will become a leader in promoting interna13 8
tional trade, rather than a major source of international ill-will.
Eliminating the waiver will also increase the United States' bargaining power. The United States would be able to attack international import quota use more effectively and assert its rights more
aggressively before the GATT.1"9 As a result, GATT prestige and
power will increase. 14 0 This increase, occasioned by the stronger presence of the United States in GATT, will create greater United States
involvement in world trade regulation activities.""

IV.

CONCLUSION

Quota use among GATT members is widespread because many
countries engage in agricultural protectionism. 14 2 For this reason,
GATT has been termed a "swiss cheese" rule.14 3 Despite its failures
137. This does not mean that the United States will be left with no agricultural defenses.
It can utilize GATT articles to get necessary protection, thereby supporting GATT.
138. 9 US IMPORT WEEKLY 235, Nov. 9, 1983. At the Nov. 1-2 session of the GATT Council old and new waivers from GATT obligations were the main bone of contention. The United
States' 1955 waiver was heavily criticized by a number of nations. Since 1955, each annual
report has been the occasion for sharp criticism from those trading partners who believe the
waiver has denied them fair access to markets for their farm goods in the U.S. New Zealand has
called for a GATT working party to reexamine the waiver.
139. See supra notes 107-120 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
141. 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 79:A-16, May 27, 1981. U.S. Trade Representative Brock endorsed the GATT for the Reagan Administration, and said it was the most important cornerstone for international trade. This shows the present Administration is disposed to work with
the GATT.
142. See supra note 110. See also ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICES-FOREIGN 60, 1963. In
1963, the United States had 26% of the value of its agricultural production under nontariff
protection. Other countries had the following percentages: France-94%, Canada-41%, Japan76%, Italy-63%, United Kingdom-37%.
143. 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 895-97. Senator Proxmire (D-Wis.) said the GATT is done
and over because there are so many trade limitations now that it is no longer relevant. Mr.
Hufbauer, senior fellow at the Institute of International Economics, said the Most Favored
Nation principle is now only conditional. See also, 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY, at 247, 11/24/82.
Sen. Mattingly (R-Ga.) said the United States was at the end of the free trade route because
other nations were not reciprocating. Reciprocity is a major principle and cornerstone of
GATT. It is a "give and take" idea implying that there is a mutuality of gains in multilateral
trade negotiations by providing equivalent concessions to concession pledging parties. But see
Id. at 69. GATT Director General Dunkel said members, not machinery, is to blame for world
trade problems. He cited the U.S. complaint after it lost a GATT panel ruling concerning
wheat export subsidies by the EEC. GATT members should try to settle in private negotiation
first, and if GATT comes up with a ruling members should abide by the ruling rather than
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with agricultural quota problems, GATT is not defunct."" It continues to play an important role in world trade affairs 148 and will be at
center stage if the United States effects changes in its agricultural
policy.' 46 These changes may come about through the reduction of
federal spending and a decision to turn agricultural trade over to
free-market influences. 47 The result may be an incease in GATT importance as other countries follow the United States move toward
greater free trade.' 48
GEORGE WELCH

complain. The GATT member governments should try to interpret and safeguard the GATT
and not try to tear it down.
144. See 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 75: A-8, April 29, 1981. 1980 was a record year for handling disputes in the GATT framework. This also shows the trading world is in difficulty and
that domestic industries are being protected by import quotas. See also 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY
230, Dec. 2, 1982. Eighty-seven countries agreed to meet concerning tariff-cutting negotiations,
showing there is still confidence in GATT.
145. See supra notes 142-144.
146. See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 14, 111 and 138.
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